

MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUTURE: GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Klaus J. Bade and Myron Weiner. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997. Pp. 158.

MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND FOREIGN POLICY: U.S. AND GERMAN POLICIES TOWARD COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN. By Rainer Münz and Myron Weiner. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997. Pp.368.

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The initial two volumes of a planned five volume series under the overall editorship of Myron Weiner are of uneven quality. The series is sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences with financial support from the German-American Academic Council Foundation. It is based on the work of three working groups convened by the Academy which were composed of German and American scholars from a variety of disciplines. Thirty scholars participated in the project. The final chapter of *Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy* makes public recommendations which were presented at the meetings in Bonn and Washington, D.C.

The conceptualization and undertaking of this project are noteworthy because they reflect heightened awareness of the significance of international migration, especially in international relations and foreign policy. The first volume argues that, for all the dissimilarities between U.S. and German immigration histories, the two states confront similar challenges in regulating international migration, integrating immigrants and accommodating greater societal diversity, which is fated to increase in the future. A quarter century earlier, pioneering comparisons of German and U.S. migration policies reached similar conclusions but were less readily accepted. The notion that international migration had important consequences for German politics and foreign policy met with disbelief.

Klaus Bade's history of international migration to and from Germany in the first volume, as well as Rainer Münz' overview, provide an excellent historical rationale for comparison of international migration to Germany and the United States. The principal problem of the series, evident in the first two volumes, is redundancy. German contributors go over and over the same material. Bade and Münz make the same point - that Germany has become an immigration land similar to the United States without being able to conceive itself as such. This disjuncture between declared public policy and reality impedes immigrant incorporation in Germany. The suggestion is that Germans would do well to adopt a U.S. - style approach, which facilitates immigrant incorporation.

The two American contributions to the first volume are of less interest than the German contributions although there is less of a sense of *déjà vu* and redundancy in the American chapters. Reed Ueda offers a celebratory history of international migration to the United States which he conceives of as an immigration country of assimilative pluralism. This style of U.S. immigration history is popular among German intellectuals who abhor the Germany is not a land of immigration-dictum and favor a U.S.-style approach to immigration and immigrant integration. The problem is that accounts such as Ueda's are not even-handed. They are sufficiently critical and ignore key elements of the downside of U.S. immigration history.

Ueda suggests that a cosmopolitan openness characterized attitudes towards immigration from the colonial period on. Thomas Archdeacon in *Becoming American*, by way of contrast, suggests that there was a greater tendency towards cultural homogeneity and the early emergence of a dominant English-derived cultural model. Ueda's account does not dwell on the hardships and discrimination encountered by Roman Catholic Irish immigration in the 1840s or on the Know-Nothing movement. The post-1965 openness to bias-free legal immigration within the qualitative and quantitative limitations of U.S. immigration law is the exception, not the rule in U.S. immigration history.

The second volume is much more interesting than the first because it compares German and U.S. policies towards countries of origin. The overall quality of the scholarship is significantly higher and generally more original. The problem of redundancy remains in several of the German contributions. The second tome is similar in inspiration to *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and US Policy* edited by Michael Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner which was based upon the proceedings of the American Assembly in 1994. There also is a degree of continuity with Myron Weiner's *International Migration and Security* manifest, for instance, in the attention accorded the Yugoslav crisis.

The chapter by Heinz-Juergen Axt on German policy towards refugee flows from former Yugoslavia is riveting. One suspects its contentions, while tentative, will long be debated in the annals of post-Cold War diplomatic history. Axt seeks to elucidate the crucial German decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991. The decision was momentous because it was unilateral, broke agreements with NATO allies and E.U. member states and virtually ensured escalation of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where large Serb minorities were certain to resist dismemberment of the Yugoslav federal state. Axt regards German policy towards the Yugoslav crisis as a failure because the timing of the decision to recognize the two nascent states did not help to prevent further conflict but rather rendered it inevitable.

A major result was the uprooting of more than 700,000 refugees who found haven in Western Europe, principally in Germany. Axt contends that thinking about possible refugee consequences played little or no role in German decision-making. Domestic political considerations were para-

mount determinants. German and other Western European leaders were preoccupied with cementing the Treaty on European Union. Axt speculates that a deal was cut. Germany would make certain concessions to European Union states concerning, for instance, the future European currency in return for its *Alleingang*, its unilateral *fait accompli*. The E.U. member-states grudgingly would soon adhere to the German line to keep up appearances of a common foreign policy. But the E.U. had stumbled badly. Germany clearly violated E.U. procedures by preempting the Badinter Commission report on whether Croatia qualified for recognition by the E.U. Axt's analysis is damning. However, characterization of Germany policy towards displacement of people from the former Yugoslavia as a failure is inappropriate. Immoral perhaps, failure no.

As Axt reports, about five million persons were displaced by conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Of these, about 700,000 arrived in the E.U. and 400,000 in Germany. About fifteen percent of Yugoslav refugees made it to Western Europe. But the vast majority of them stayed in the former Yugoslavia. Restrictive German and E.U. member state visa policies had much to do with this as did various forms of intervention ranging from the financial to the military. Most former Yugoslavs were accorded temporary protected status and many Bosnians in German states controlled by Conservatives have subsequently been required to repatriate. For better or worse, beyond the heart wrenching duress of the Yugoslav refugees, it would appear that German authorities succeeded in preventing millions of displaced persons from finding haven in Germany. The policy failure was the inability of the E.U. to prevent the Yugoslav crisis from degenerating into conflict.

Christopher Mitchell finds a similar pattern in U.S. policymaking towards the Caribbean and Central America. Immigration considerations rarely were factored into U.S. policymaking. Indeed, many U.S. policies served to encourage immigration to the U.S. Support for repressive regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala contributed to enormous population displacements including influxes to the U.S. Politically-colored standards for evaluating asylum applications by hundreds of thousands of Central Americans eventually led to legal remedies which enabled tens of thousands of persons fleeing U.S.-backed counterinsurgency campaigns to remain in the U.S. Mitchell makes a compelling case for better integration of immigration and foreign policies but also underscores the obstacles to such a synthesis.

Four German-authored chapters follow on migration in the Russia Federation, Germany's policies towards ethnic German minorities, and Soviet successor states, and post-1990 German foreign labor policies. Of these, Elmar Hoenekopp's chapter on new labor migration is the most fascinating. Circa 1990, German decisions to reopen foreign labor recruitment shocked many observers. Hoenekopp explains that resumption of foreign labor recruitment was an element in a broader German strategy to foster change and consolidate emergent democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Germany had

encouraged greater openness in the Warsaw Bloc and numbers of visas accorded citizens of Poland in particular grew. Many Central and East Europeans technically violated the terms of their visas and took up employment in agriculture, construction and hotels and restaurants. German authorities generally tolerated this because of a long-standing policy not to forcibly return persons to Communist states. Moreover, the wages and goods sent back by migrants helped attenuate the socio-economic crisis of Warsaw Bloc states. Concurrently, certain employer groups constantly prodded the German government to authorize seasonal labor employment.

The new foreign workers comprise several distinctive groups – project-tied workers, seasonal workers, border commuters, new guestworkers and nurses. By 1992, a total of 324,504 Eastern European Program Workers were admitted. But nearly all seasonal workers, for instance, receive residency and employment authorization for a maximum duration of three months and then are required to repatriate. Consequently, yearly employment volume of seasonal workers is much more modest than the gross admissions figures suggest. In 1992, 212,000 seasonal workers were admitted, but the yearly employment equivalency was 43,000. By 1995, the figures had dropped to 177,000 admissions and 36,000 manpower equivalency years respectively. Most seasonal foreign workers are recruited nominatively and work in agriculture. The implementation of the policy had a legalization effect although how extensive this effect was and precisely how it was achieved are unclear. Presumably, many farmers have hired formerly illegally-employed Polish farmworkers as seasonal workers. Hoenekopp indicates that enforcement of labor laws was stepped up to ensure compliance.

Hoenekopp's assessment of the new German foreign labor initiatives is upbeat. Many students of international migration will be skeptical. Past history of foreign labor recruitment warns that Germans risk compounding and exacerbating illegal alien employment through overstay of short-term visas and exploitation of the legally-protected workers. The past would suggest that the status afforded the seasonal workers will in time become controversial and a bone of contention in Germany's bilateral relations rather than the boon that Hoenekopp states it now.

Three American-authored chapters then follow. Myron Weiner inquires into the causes of refugee flows and generates a highly useful typology of refugee-generating conflicts. He finds that interstate wars play much less of a role in refugee-creation than civil wars, of which there are two sub-categories – ethnic and nonethnic. Ethnic conflicts are the most important factor in refugee creation.

Data on refugees between 1969 and 1992 suggest that numbers of refugees are increasing. (More recent data reveal a significant downward trend in the mid-1990s). Weiner attributes the increase to three factors – the growing violence of civil wars, the growing population displacement per conflict and so-called "bad neighborhood effects". In certain regions, especially in Africa, South Asia and the Islamic periphery of Europe,

conflicts in one state tend to trigger conflicts in neighboring states. There is a spillover effect, sometimes due to divisions of ethnic communities by international borders.

Weiner is skeptical of the effectiveness of root-cause strategies to reduce refugee flows. He is also critical of Cold War explanations of refugee flows. Indeed, he suggests that the end of the Cold War may have exacerbated the global refugee phenomenon. He suggests that there are four major options available to governments to prevent refugee creation – measures to reduce violence against noncombatants, strategies to prevent ethnic conflicts, measures to address nonethnic conflicts and repressive regimes. Weiner's advocacy of steps to prevent proliferation of land mines anticipated the 1998 international agreement to curb their use.

The single best chapter in the two tomes is Philip L. Martin's assessment of economic instruments to affect countries of origin. Martin synthesizes the findings of recent international conferences and research sponsored by the ILO, the UNHCR and several U.S. commissions to provide lucid and balanced insight. He warns that there are no quick or easy fixes. Many sensible policies run sizable risks of untoward results. He regards emigration country policies as key. They determine how fast the local economy grows and how quickly employment growth reduces pressure to emigrate. Policies of the immigration lands can influence the key process only at the margins.

Martin distances himself from migration doomsayers and terms international migration a "manageable" issue. He is struck by how few people migrate internationally and believes that reduction of wage gaps to a one to four or five ratio can virtually eliminate economically-motivated international migration. At the same time, he is realistic, and quite scathing, about the illogic of so many public policies. Western Europeans and the U.S. protect and subsidize various agricultural sectors to the detriment of agricultural employment and production in nearby emigration lands. Employers in several of these sectors number among the most dependent on foreign labor.

Barry Posner assesses military intervention as a means of limiting refugee flows. Borrowing from the conventional wisdom concerning the use of force in world affairs, he suggests that it is easier to deter the types of activities that lead to refugee flows than it is to compel regimes or non-state actors involved in refugee-generating activities to desist. A major problem in intervention, obvious in numerous recent episodes of U.S. intervention such as in Lebanon in 1982-83 and Somalia is the disjuncture between the saliency of the events for a distant power and for local combatants. The lesser importance attached to matters by the distant power translates into lack of resolution and commitment and an unwillingness to accept losses. Posner reviews the options available to major powers like the U.S. and its NATO allies in Western Europe such as strategic bombing, creation of safe havens and enforced truces. He concludes by warning that humanitarian intervention will often prove less gentle than it sounds.

The most important recommendation made in the final chapter echoes that made by the American Assembly in 1994 to the U.S. government. Governments need to do a better job integrating immigration policy concerns into a broad array of public policies. To accomplish this, they need to reorganize public administrations, reprioritize and retrain. Obviously, this will be a long-term effort. Educational institutions will have an important role to play in this. Governments also need to take bilateral, regional, and international cooperation on international migration more seriously. Martin correctly notes that migration is the most important international economic phenomenon that is not coordinated by an international organization.

However, some of the difficulty in achieving greater cooperation is apparent in the closing chapter itself. The discussion of guestworker policies is muddled and objectionable. The assertion on page 331 and 332 that "...[t]he German experience shows that both the sudden recruitment stop of 1973 and limited financial incentives for those returning voluntarily (1983/84) have reduced significantly the number of foreigners working in the country" is misleading. The suggestion that social security contributions by foreign workers be regarded as a forced saving scheme and withheld from them until their return home prior to pensionable age appears difficult to reconcile with ILO instruments pertaining to migrant labor. There is a regression to a guestworker policy era mentality in which human beings become remittance-producing commodities and workers rights are restricted. The guestworker policy advocacy mars an otherwise sensible discussion.