

Recent Social and Political History in West Germany*

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The noted Austrian labour historian, Rudolf Neck, once commented with regard to the first stage of the Fischer controversy in German historiography (1962) that Fischer's work encouraged him not to despair about the German *Wesen*.¹ Since then a steady stream of scholarly works has flowed from the pens of mostly younger historians who have received their training in the atmosphere of postwar Germany and who have imbibed the critical, rational and humanist-cosmopolitan spirit which characterizes the work of the most outstanding German academic revisionist of the older generation, namely Fritz Fischer himself.

The most recent public acknowledgement of the stimulus to research provided by Fischer is that by Professor Hans-Adolf Jacobsen of Bonn who wrote that it was above all due to Fritz Fischer that the problem of the continuity of German foreign policy in the twentieth century has been getting so much attention in recent times.² While Jacobsen emphasizes the impetus given to foreign policy questions by Fischer, Professor Klaus Saul of Hamburg makes the further observation that Fischer's work had stimulated a range of studies (directly and indirectly) on domestic political issues.³ Of course foreign and domestic policy are interrelated, and perhaps Fischer's main contribution has been to demonstrate so convincingly that German foreign policy to 1914 and war aims to 1918 were generated by a constellation of powerful 'nationally-minded' pressure groups that were seeking above all to cement their social, political and economic position within the Reich against the real or imagined threat of revolutionary upheaval instigated by social democracy. In doing this, Fischer had really only harked back to the pioneering work of Eckart Kehr (1902-33) but Fischer's merit lies in the fact that he has built upon Kehr's initiative and confirmed the general validity of the latter's method in West Germany. There can now be no return to the older so called 'strictly individualising method' which was the stock-in-trade of the conservative Hegelian-Rankean school.⁴

West Germany therefore finds itself in the 'Fischer era' of historical scholarship, although there are still some who refuse to acknowledge it.⁵ Obviously the swing away from historicism to a methodology ap-

* This review article is concerned specifically with these works
Klassengesellschaft im Krieg 1914-1918. By Jürgen Kocka. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1973). Pp. 230.

Sozialgeschichte Heute-Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag. Edited by Hans-Ulrich Wehler. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1974). Pp. 669.

Burgfrieden und Klassenkampf: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im ersten Weltkrieg. By Susanne Miller. (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1974). Pp. 440.

Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit—Revolution—Depression—Expansion. By Klaus-Jürgen Bade. (Freiburg i Br. Atlantis Verlag, 1975). Pp. 579.

Tradition und Neubeginn—Internationale Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. By Joachim Hütter, Reinhard Meyers, Dietrich Papenfuss. (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1975). Pp. 565.

1. Rudolf Neck, 'Kriegszielpolitik im ersten Weltkrieg', *Deutsche Kriegsziele 1914-1918*, ed. Ernst W. Graf (Lynar, Frankfurt/M, 1964), p. 157. *Wesen* is perhaps best rendered here by 'character'.

2. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 'Anmerkungen zum Problem der Kontinuität deutscher Aussenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert', *Tradition und Neubeginn*, ed. J. Hütter, R. Meyers & Dietrich Papenfuss (Köln, 1975), p. 1.

3. Klaus Saul, *Staat, Industrie, Arbeiterbewegung im Kaiserreich* (Düsseldorf, 1974), p. 9; cf the report by M. Stürmer on the literature that has emerged in West Germany on the various pressure groups in Wilhelmine Germany since Fischer's work appeared, in *Neue Politische Literatur*, XIV (1969), pp. 490-507.

4. For a discussion of Fischer's significance, see John A. Moses, *The Politics of Illusion—The Fischer Controversy in Germany*, (London/Brisbane, 1945).

5. An interesting example of this is the work of the young historian Klaus Hildebrand who has recently tried to enlist structural history in trying to weaken the impact of Fischer's work. It is true that a number of West German historians reproach Fischer for being too ready to make moralistic judgments, ie for introducing an ethical element which, it is alleged, lessens his objectivity. The other extreme to this is, of course, to see events as being governed entirely by impersonal forces—exactly what Hildebrand seems to believe. See his 'Imperialismus. Wettüsten und Kriegsausbruch 1914', *Neue Politische Literatur*, XX (1975), pp. 160-94, 330-64.

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appropriate to social history would have had to come in Germany after 1945 even without the Fischer school. The tendency was already there if only for the fact that no rehabilitation of conservative, nationalist or monarchist values would have been possible within the strictures of a dismembered and occupied fatherland. Nevertheless, the Fischer school was the first significant group to draw any radical conclusions from this situation—Ludwig Dehio, Fritz Ernst and Hans Rothfels notwithstanding.⁶ The Fischer school not only added impetus to the trend but lent it a particularly forward-looking (as opposed to a reluctant and nostalgia-laden) character. Indeed, the modernity of the Fischer school is now being grasped by those who resent its frank repudiation of the historicist conservatism and national apologetics.

The five volumes selected here for review are all examples of these important new developments in the Federal Republic—although the collection of papers edited by Hütter, Meyer and Papenfuss represents largely the work of non-German pupils of postwar German historians and as such is included as an example of modern German foreign policy in the field of cultural exchange.

The work of Jürgen Kocka has been stirring up much attention both within and outside West Germany.⁷ A former pupil of Gerhard A. Ritter, Kocka has emerged as a leading proponent of the German modification of 'structural history', and the present work represents his most significant contribution to date. In addressing himself to the question of social change in Germany during the First World War, Kocka has explored another dimension opened up by Fischer's two large works on German war aims and the prehistory of that war. Both of these were virtually revolutionary departures from traditional diplomatic history in Germany—mainly because of the stress on the domestic origins of policy. Now Kocka has sought to examine the effects of the war on social and economic structures within the Reich with the aim of fitting the period into a social and economic interpretation. In attempting this Kocka strictly avoids the historical materialism of East German writers on the subject.⁸ Indeed, Kocka's concern is with the reciprocal relationships of the classes and groups in their economic, social, social-psychological and political categories within the unprecedented complex of strains of wartime.

Specifically Kocka is trying to isolate the socially relevant changes in the processes of production and distribution as well as the constantly shifting strata within the social structure. Beyond this his ambition is to identify the transformations in the collective class attitudes, expectations, self-understanding and growth in political leverage of various groups. All this involves an examination of the changing alliances, conflicts and compromises between groups—and finally an assessment of the position of the 'state' amid the general tensions.

Methodologically this poses a formidable task, and Kocka here avails himself of a Marxian model. His basic assumption is that class membership of individuals and groups is determined by their position in the system of capitalistically organized production; that is to say by their share or non-share in private property and power to manipulate the means of production. Kocka's adjustment to the Marxian model postulates a so-called *Klassengegensatz* (class dichotomy) between the owners of the means of production on the one hand and the wage and salary earners on the other. This 'class dichotomy' is characterized by the fact that dominant 'objective' factors of property and power are not necessarily perceived by the classes. In other words there were groups unaware of their class dependency. It was, however, the chief structural factor in promoting class tension, and this affected life in all spheres because it determined access to income and consumption opportunities, education, status and political power. For this reason the 'state' tends to become the instrument of the economically dominant groups.

On a second level the class situation and 'class dichotomy' determined the subjective or 'manifest' interests, expectations, goals, attitudes and self-image (*Selbstverständnis*) of the class members who through sharing these elements recognise their class identity. The 'class dichotomy' reveals itself as class tension in their consciousness and expressions of dissatisfaction, hopes, resentments, protests and demands—all of which can be to a greater or lesser extent historically determined. The transformation of 'class dichotomy' into class tension was signified by the growth in the awareness of dependent groups of a discrepancy between their actual opportunities on the one hand and their subjectively understood legitimate aspirations and demands on the other. This was exacerbated by the fact that the war significantly reduced the opportunities of some dependent groups whereas it increased the expectations of others.

6. cf John A. Moses, 'The Crisis in German Historiography—Origins and Trends', *Historical Studies*, XIII (1969), pp. 445-59.

7. Jürgen Kocka, 'Theoretical Approaches to the Social and Economic History of Modern Germany: Some Recent Trends, Concepts and Problems in Western and Eastern Germany', *The Journal of Modern History*, XLVII (1975), pp. 101-19; 'Sozialgeschichte-Strukturgeschichte-Gesellschaftsgeschichte', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, XV (1975), pp. 1-42.

8. cf The monumental work edited by the East German historian Fritz Klein, *Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 3 vols (Berlin, 1969).

On yet another level, the class situation and 'class dichotomy' determined the organization of class interests and stimulated them to actions for the attainment and/or defence of their various goals and achievements. So the 'class dichotomy' became a class conflict in which the state was employed in the interests of the economically dominant groups to the disadvantage of the majority of the population.⁹

As Kocka emphasizes, the extent and the form of this process depends not on any automatically given factors—as with Marxist writers—but on changing conditions which are empirically recognisable. The Marxian model according to which the entire society splits itself inexorably into two hostile classes—the one demonstrably smaller but accumulating ever more power and property, the other, the exploited masses organizing themselves into an outraged working class—is not applied here with dogmatic conviction. The image projected by Kocka of German wartime society is far more differentiated. Indeed, Kocka is well aware of non-class conditioned tensions such as those between religious denominations, regions, generations, the urban and rural sector and among the various branches of industry. Such social fronts overlapped the traditional class barriers to which the Marxian model is restricted. Nevertheless Kocka wishes to confirm that the dichotomy in the class structure became more and more evident.

An important point, however, is that Kocka is not concerned to prove or disprove the Marxian model but rather to apply it to historical reality for this limited period to see where the model coincided or diverged from it. Methodologically this represents the most conscious effort to date by a West German non-Marxist historian to extract as much benefit as possible from a skilful non-doctrinaire application of Marxist categories. As such Kocka's work must be seen as systematizing a great deal of the method used by Fischer (and Kehr before him) and making them 'respectable' in West German universities. After all, one of the great complaints about Fischer was that he had borrowed too much from Marxist methodology. This sort of objection should be less frequently heard now that Kocka has established himself.

A further point is that Kocka has finally brought West German historiography up to the stage where it will be increasingly difficult for East German historians to criticize their Western colleagues for being too reactionary. The virtual break down in East-West German historical dialogue would now have the chance to resume, provided of course that the East German colleagues show themselves to be a little more intellectually flexible than they have been hitherto.

However, for the ideologically less encumbered historian Kocka's book is extremely helpful. It certainly throws a much more differentiated light than hitherto on the way groups re-aligned within the Reich during the war and how this re-alignment affected the subsequent social-political structure, ie how the rigid and polarised Wilhelmine state was compelled—much against its will—to recognize that its anachronistic constitution no longer conformed to the realities of a highly industrialized economy. What comes out with shattering impact is the failure of the Wilhelmine bureaucracy to cope with the stresses and strains imposed on the economy by the war. The massive dislocations and resultant shortages, all of which Kocka documents statistically, particularly in consumer goods, the accompanying profiteering and blatant injustices in the distribution of goods created a widespread disillusionment with the 'state'. This was the 'state' that had by virtue of its radical intervention in the economy established (or tried to) a system of so-called 'war socialism'. The 'state's' total incompetence in handling this to the satisfaction of both industry and consumers conjured up opposition from most unexpected sources, the middle class and the industrialists. The moderate Socialist trade union leadership, formerly in a posture of rabid hostility to the 'state', was now paradoxically among its most loyal supporters.

For decades the Socialist unions had pursued a policy of steady organizational expansion in order to compel the 'state' by virtue of massive strength to reform both the constitution and the economic structure to bring justice to the working class. The war offered the unions an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate their indispensability to the 'state' and thereby actually to win the concessions so ardently desired. Ironically, the all-competent Prusso-German military state having showed itself unequal to the task for which it was designed, was forced to turn to the union leadership to enlist its help in keeping the home front as quiet as possible. The unions, of course, had embarked on their policy of 4th August (ie a discontinuance of strike action for the duration of the war as well as active cooperation with the 'state') with precisely the aim of using their increased influence to extract concessions from the state.

The Auxiliary War Service Law which was passed at the end of 1916 and which conceded most of the unions' long-standing demands was of course only regarded by the 'state' as a means of placating the working class during the stress of war. It did not signify a change of heart by the 'state'. The same was true of the industrialists' eleventh hour pact with the unions which also guaranteed the same concessions for the coming peace. The war had created strange bed fellows indeed, but the union leadership had won its concessions at the price of alienating large sections of the working class. So, as Kocka shows, the war had created a bizarre constellation of forces within Germany which at once generated the revolution but then held it back from running its natural course. The 'class dichotomy' had developed into 'class dichotomy' as the underprivileged masses became more and more deprived of the necessities of life. Their protests were noted by the military authorities in particular who were anxious to maintain domestic stability in order not

9. Kocka, *Klassengesellschaft*, p. 5; cf Wolfgang J. Mommsen's review of Kocka's book in *Journal of Modern History*, XLVII (1975), pp. 530-38.

to jeopardise production. This explains the readiness of the military to concede the demands of the unions, even though they were numerically depleted, to institutionalize an entire range of demands for worker protection, arbitration and worker representation in factories (Auxiliary War Service Law).¹⁰ But even these safety valve measures were inadequate to silence the growing discontent.

The central war aim of Prusso-Germany had been to preserve the military monarchy intact against the forces of democracy and revolution, and this emerged as a tragic illusion. In reality the Prusso-German Hohenzollern state had become a giant industrial-commercial complex with constitutional features derived from an agrarian feudal era. The strains it underwent from 1914 to 1918 were the social-historical pre-conditions for the revolution. The all-competent 'state' had been demonstrated incompetent to survive. Workers, employers and farmers were all disillusioned with it rather than their class antagonists, and the 'state' was unable adequately to defuse the growing tensions. It therefore gradually lost sympathy, prestige, support and ultimately legitimacy.

However, the section whose disillusionment with the 'state' had had the most far-ranging impact was the industrialist power elite. They had become very angry at the 'state's' radical intervention in the economy. And their anti-statism drove them in November 1918 into the famous pact with the unions which was a major factor in curtailing the revolution and in laying the foundation for the Weimar constitution.

Kocka's 'structural-historical' method has performed a pioneering service for German historiography and shed a fresh clinical light on an emotion-charged topic. As such it is a most welcome scholarly 'conquest of the German past'.

A somewhat more senior 'conqueror of the German past' is Hans-Ulrich Wehler who since the publication of his *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* in 1969 has been tireless in his efforts to discover a new social role for the professional historian in Germany.¹¹ The present volume of essays under his editorship is a *Festschrift* in honour of the emigrant German-American historian Hans Rosenberg, born 1904, and is a noteworthy collection of more than thirty contributions—noteworthy for several reasons. First of all it is very appropriate that a scholar of Rosenberg's achievements be honoured in this way. A historian who can produce seminal studies about a country from whose archives he was cut off until after 1945, and that in the remoteness of North America while engaged in a heavy teaching load is a remarkable achievement.¹²

Secondly, Rosenberg had not only produced seminal studies at a difficult time, but did so in two distinct areas, the social history of the Prussian bureaucracy in the seventeenth century as well as the social-economic history of Bismarckian Germany.¹³ For this reason, Wehler had initially set out to produce a volume dedicated to these areas under the headings 'Society and Economy in the 19th and 20th Centuries', 'Bureaucracy in the 17th Century' and 'Liberalism in the 19th Century'. However, as things developed, the majority of scholars were social historians emphasizing the emergence of groups, classes, institutions, movements and conflicts. All these questions are analyzed in such a way to show that social questions are intimately bound up with economic and political issues. The challenge this poses methodologically, ie the combining of empirical analyses with theoretical reflection is here adequately overcome.

Thirdly, the collection is remarkable because of the composition of the team of writers. They are the former North American and German pupils (Rosenberg was a guest professor in Berlin after the war) as well as German and American friends and colleagues. Of the thirty-six collaborators twenty-four are West Germans. This is significant because everyone of them completed his or her training in the postwar era. It means that the professorial chairs in the Federal Republic—as far as modern history is concerned—are now to a great extent occupied by scholars who are far more open to experiment with new methods and prepared to explore new avenues than many of their former teachers were. That the older generation were psychologically unable to embrace new methods—the existence of the Schieder school in Cologne and the Conze school in Heidelberg notwithstanding—was illustrated dramatically by their reception of the research of their own contemporary, Fritz Fischer. The younger generation is by inclination prepared to accept 'foreign' brands of scholarship on their merits. In other words the prevailing trend in West German historiography seems to be happily cosmopolitan.

The shock administered to the historicist-statist tradition by the Fischer school has stimulated not only a confrontation with social and structural history but also the rehabilitation of pioneering outsiders from pre-

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 199ff., 131-35.

11. Wehler's productivity is legendary in German historical circles.

12. Wehler, ed. *Sozialgeschichte Heute*, p. 14.

13. See Hans Rosenberg's, 'The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg Prussia, 1410-1653', *American Historical Review*, XLIX (1943-44), pp. 1-22, 228-42; 'Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in Central Europe', *Economic History Review*, XIII (1943), pp. 58-73; 'The Economic Impact of Imperial Germany', *Journal of Economic History*, III (1943), suppl. 101-7.

Nazi Germany such as Eckart Kehr¹⁴ (posthumously) and the reacceptance of scholars such as Hans Rosenberg himself. The present scholarly internationalism and methodological experimentation evident in West Germany as indicated by the *Festschrift* stands out in sharp relief when compared to the pre-1933 situation. The present volume bears further witness to his dramatic change.

Another example of a formerly persecuted citizen now a fully recognized historian in Germany is Susanne Miller. Her outstanding research on Marxism in the Social Democratic party with which she is closely identified has now been augmented by the present detailed documentation of the behaviour of that party during the First World War.¹⁵ Although Frau Miller makes no claim to methodological innovation like Kocka on the same period, she does provide a highly valuable chronicle of the impact of the imperialist war on what was officially a pacifist and republican movement. Miller's concern in contrast to Kocka is with explaining the mind of the party, addressing herself to the large ideological question as to why the former 'vagabonds without a fatherland' suddenly 'discovered' their country in August 1914. Considered as a sort of companion to Kocka's *Klassengesellschaft im Krieg*, Miller's *Bunzfrieden und Klassenkampf* serves as a solid piece of more traditional political history. The account of the SPD in the war, of the 'Great Schism' and its far-ranging consequences will be obligatory reading for all historians wishing to get a better grasp of the internal history of the Weimar Republic and its constitution with which the SPD and the Socialist unions so closely identified themselves.

As a stalwart of the present SPD, Frau Miller writes as an involved historian of her party and is an advocate of the continuity of the movement of that era with the contemporary scene. This puts her work in the category of a partisan study—up to a point. The comment of the East German reviewer, Dieter Fricke, is significant: 'Summing up, her book is nothing more than an attempt, in contradiction to historical reality, to justify indirectly the policies and ideology which are being pursued today by the right wing SPD leaders'.¹⁶ In this way one ideological justification attempts to refute another.

Klaus J. Bade's massive work on Friedrich Fabri and Bismarckian imperialism appears on the surface to be in the category of familiar political biography. This would, however, be a misrepresentation of both its intent and its range. Fabri (1824-91) was one of the most successful ideologues of German overseas expansion who until now had been virtually ignored by research as belonging to an ineffectual quasi-lunatic fringe. Bade shows that nothing could be further from the truth. This study, built up from a dissertation, is seen by the author as expanding upon Hans-Ulrich Wehler's pioneering work on Bismarck's imperialism. As such it is a weighty contribution to modern German social political history because Bade is concerned to explain the colonial movement as emerging from the changing social-economic structure of the Bismarckian Reich. The person of Fabri as a prophet of social imperialism is depicted as the essential ideological motor for a critical aspect of the movement. But as stated above, the study far exceeds the limits of biography; the central figure is rather the focal point linking up the various tendencies of his time.

Methodologically the work has the ambition to be a social history ranging from the revolutionary period of 1848 through to the era of economic depression 1873-96 whereby the theme of colonial expansion forms the unifying thread. Of course, how Fabri, a clergyman and chairman of a Lutheran missionary society, came to develop an efficacious theory of colonial missions and came to exert such a high degree of influence on German industrialists, financiers, bureaucrats and even on Bismarck himself is both a fascinating and historiographically important subject—not least because it sheds light on the vexed question of the nature of imperialism.

The significance of Fabri's activity as an advocate of overseas expansion lies in the fact that he was able at a time of intense German migration to convince the public at large and the bureaucrats in particular of the need to direct the export of the surplus labour force—not to other nations' colonies or the Americas but to German colonies. When all facets of this were considered it would result in an economic return to the mother land. As it was thousands of productive Germans were being lost to the nation. Colonies were therefore a vital social-economic, and national-cultural factor which the Reich could not afford to ignore. Bade's meticulous examination of the growth of this ideology, its impact on other propagandists and groups as well as its implementation is without doubt the most notable study on both the intellectual and social history of German colonialism yet to appear and must be regarded as a milestone in the now extensive monographic literature in the general field of the roots of nineteenth century European imperialism. The earlier works by Hagen, Zimmermann, A.J.P. Taylor, Townsend and Henderson have all been superseded. Bade's work is all the more valuable because of the sophistication of its method, achieving as it does a happy synthesis between the 'strictly individualising method' of the traditional German approach with that of social history. This is surely one of the most fruitful by-products of the German encounter with methodologies formerly disregarded by the highly conservative guild. In the hands of young scholars like

14. cf Wehler's edition of Kehr's collected essays, *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (Berlin, 1965).

15. See Miller's earlier work, *Das Problem der Freiheit im Sozialismus—Freiheit, Staat und Revolution in der Programmatik der Sozialdemokratie von Lassalle bis zum Revisionismusstreit*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt/M, 1964).

16. Dieter Fricke's review in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, XXIII (1975) p. 1331.

Bade, the best of that discipline, the foundations of which were laid by Ranke, and the more sociologically oriented discipline which now characterizes modern German scholarship are skilfully combined.

If further proof were needed of West German concern to cultivate and maintain a dialogue with foreign historians we have it in the fifth volume to be discussed here. In September 1974 the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation invited all the modern historians from abroad who had previously studied in Germany on grants from the foundation to participate in a conference under the general theme of continuity and discontinuity in German foreign policy since 1918. The present volume represents the proceedings of the conference and contains the papers of thirty-six contributors. Only five papers from West German historians were included although many more than that actually participated. Essentially the volume is a vehicle for the non-German historians to ventilate their research—all of which concerns the history of the German nation in the twentieth century.

The significance of the collection undoubtedly lies in the fact that it reveals the tip of the iceberg of interest in modern German history around the world. As Fritz Stern in the *Failure of Illiberalism* (p. XIII) remarked, '[h]istorians have long realised that the German past is central to an understanding of our own era. For seventy-five years Germany dominated the politics of Europe; in the cataclysms of the twentieth century, she played a decisive role.' This gathering of historians from fourteen countries bore eloquent testimony to this observation.

As a participant in that conference, the present writer was impressed by the objectivity and frankness of the West German historians—many quite senior scholars—who attended either as commentators or as contributors. These historians, in particular Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Andreas Hillgruber demonstrated a remarkable detachment in their discussion of the continuity problem in German history. This is all the more noteworthy since they did not have the reputation of being revisionists to the extent that the Fischer school are. Indeed, Professor Hillgruber has shown himself to be one of Fischer's most persistent conservative opponents. Nevertheless, on this occasion, it was most obvious that the waves of revisionism stirred up by Fischer and Geiss, have had their impact in an ever increasing circle, and German historians of all persuasions have felt bound to take account of this revisionism—even if they are unable to accept it in all its implications.

This, however, is a most heartening fact. It indicates a new willingness to tolerate other points of view within the guild in West Germany as well as a willingness to listen to the views of non-German and among them, Communist, historians about a range of themes in modern German history. This international dialogue and academic pluralism must be regarded as an indication of the condition of democracy in West Germany. In his very lucid survey of German foreign policy to the present, Hans-Adolf Jacobson made a comment which is applicable to the academic atmosphere in West Germany today. He wrote:

Without exaggerating we may observe: the Federal Republic sees itself as part of its environment and does not act in isolation. In its policy of balancing interests she takes into consideration not only the western alliance in which she feels herself to be firmly anchored, but also takes account of the interests of the socialist states. The Federal Republic of Germany has accepted her new role as a larger middle power, i.e. her natural position in due accordance with her weight—also in relation to the extended sphere of activity in eastern Europe since 1970. Her contribution to the peaceful order of Europe and total European cooperation as well as her preparedness to stand by economically weaker states of this earth bear witness to this. After her historical experience, and in view of the world political situation there is no alternative for her. Again, in this is expressed the basically new element in her policies as opposed to those of the past.¹⁷

Bearing in mind the reciprocal relationship between the academic moulders of political will and the structure of social-political forces, Professor Jacobsen's observations about West German foreign policy applies equally well to the guild of German historians. The willingness to be an active part of a wider international environment has been symbolically confirmed by the extraordinarily generous action of the Humboldt Foundation in staging first the international conference and then by the publication of its proceedings in an extremely solid volume.

To all who are aware of the dangerous role the discipline of history played in pre-1945 Germany the books reviewed here must give cause for much satisfaction. If, as in the past, the atmosphere in the German universities was a fairly sure gauge of political opinion, the present atmosphere, despite the antics of the chaotic far Left, is a most encouraging one indeed.

17. Bade, *Friedrich Fabri*, p. 24.

18. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 'Anmerkungen ...', p. 21.